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1 Introduction
Most analyses of urban land use allocation have been based upon theories which rely on
land price gradients in relation to some monocentric or polycentric urban loci, with
transport costs as the underlying prime mover.  This paper presents an alternative
(though not mutually exclusive) theory, by focusing on the relative preferences of
different land users (residential, commercial and industrial) as the driver of land
allocation. The paper considers how, under free-trade,  preference-heterogeneity for
contiguous land use will determine the distribution of land utilisation across urban space.
We assume land is initially distributed evenly between the three types of land use and that
residential land users prefer sites with housing as the main Contiguous Land Use (CLU)
to sites with industrial or commercial CLU.  Ceteris paribus, residential land users will be
willing to trade more than one unit of land with industrial CLU for a unit with residential
CLU.  In contrast, industrial land users, who are assumed to be indifferent between
different CLUs, are willing to exchange residential CLU land for industrial CLU land at2
the initial exchange rate being offered by residential land users.   Commercial land users
are indifferent between residential and commercial CLU, but averse to industrial CLU.
Assuming constant marginal utility of land consumption, residential, commercial and
industrial land users trade land units until no further exchange can be made without
making at least one trading partner worse off.   It is anticipated that once equilibrium is
reached, housing suppliers have fewer units of land overall, and these units tend to be
clustered.  In contrast, industrial land users have more units of land overall, and these
plots are more likely to be scattered than clustered.  It is ambiguous whether commercial
land users gain land, but it is likely that their final allocation of plots will be sandwiched
between residential and industrial land use.
The paper also discusses the implications for property supply elasticities of contiguous
land use preference heterogeneity.   In particular, preference heterogeneity has an
adverse effect on the substitutability of land plots with different CLUs.  This has
important implications for the responsiveness of new construction to the release of
vacant land, particularly in relation to whether the land allocation system is zoned or
random.
1.1 Plan of paper
The paper will begin with an overview of the existing literature.  We will then develop
the basic CLU model, and describe a worked example using hypothetical utilities and
endowments.  The implications of the model are then considered for land release policy
and the price elasticity of supply of housing.
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3 Background Literature
It is not within the scope of this paper to provide anything like a comprehensive review
of the urban spatial structure literature, and since a fairly recent attempt at this task has
already been published (Anas, Arnott, & Small, 1998; see also Fujita, 1989) there would
be little to gain anyway.  ‘Academic as well as other observers have long sought
explanations for urban development patterns and criteria by which to judge their
desirability’ (ibid, p. 1426) and so it is not surprising that this literature is truly vast.  The
general understanding of the development of modern cities focuses on advances in
transport and communication as the main drivers of the modern urban spatial structure.
Moses and Williamson (1967), for example, show how transport and scale economies
develop around locations with access to transport links (such as harbours and railway
stations) and how residences tend to surround this emerging central business district
(CBD).
This view of urban development came to be embodied in the Monocentric City Model
which came to dominate the theoretical analysis of urban spatial structure for more than
twenty years.  Originating in von Thunen’s (1826) theory of agricultural land use and
Alonso’s (1964) formulation, the model has been developed in various directions (in
particular, following early developments by Mills, 1967, 1972; and Muth, 1969) to
incorporate transport, housing, and production.  It has become such an influential and
flexible paradigm because ‘it provides a rigorous framework for analyzing the spatial
aspects of the general-equilibrium adjustments that take place in cities, and for
empirically measuring and comparing the degree of centralisation across cities and time
periods’ (Anas et al, p. 1434).4
More recently, however, the monocentric model has been displaced by theories which
allow for polycentric development, given the ‘tendency of economic activity to cluster in
several interacting centres of activity’ (op cit, p. 1439).  Agglomerations of economic
activity in non-uniform patterns have been explained in a number of ways.  First, spatial
inhomogeneities (such as soil, climate, mineral deposits, access to waterways etc) can
give rise to ‘backyard economies’ even with constant returns to scale in production
(Berliant and Konishi, 1996).  Second, economies of scale in some part of the production
process, such as the loading and unloading of goods.  This formed the basis for the
original conceptualisation of urban monocentricity, based on the economies of scale
associated with harbours, but for modern means of transport, most notably road haulage,
only small scale loading/unloading equipment may be needed and so many centres of
activity arise.  Stiglitz (1977) suggested the production of local public goods (temples,
marketplaces, theatres, libraries etc.) as another source of scale economies
Third, agglomeration can arise out of external economies, and incorporate both
economies localisation (causing cities to be specialised) and of urbanisation (causing
cities to be diversified).  Interindustry linkages arise because inputs to one industry are
produced by another and these may encourage co-location to reduce overall costs
External economies may also be dynamic, such as those arising from knowledge transfer
and its effect on technological progress (Romer, 1986), and some may fit both the
localisation and urbanisation categories (such as economies of mass reserves – Robinson,
1931; Hoover, 1948).5
Fourth, imperfect competition models have been developed in a spatial context to show
how ‘critical mass’ and ‘big-push’ effects can shape the urban structure (see Gabszewiez
and Thisse, 1986 for a review).  These basic driver of these models is the conditions
under which different producers have incentives to co-locate (Schulz and Stahl, 1996;
Bacon, 1984; Krugman, 1991b, 1993).
More recently, a new category of analysis has emerged, labelled by Anas et al as
‘Noneconomic Dynamic Models’.  These essentially draw inspiration from recent
developments made in modelling natural processes, which have highlighted the nonlinear
dynamic nature underlying many natural phenomenon (included in this category are
chaos theory, complex systems, fractals, dissipative structures, and self organisation).
What they have in common is ‘some form of positive feedback … which in the urban
growth context takes the form of development at one location somehow enhancing the
development potential of nearby locations’.  Strictly speaking, this is not a separate
category, but a means of expressing tradition agglomeration economics in a dynamic
fashion which is able to simulate the often profound consequences of feedback effects
(Arthur, 1990, Nelson, 1995).
It is against this detailed and well trodden mass of literature, then, that we attempt to
proffer an ‘additional’ process driving the formation of urban spatial structure.  In
contrast to the explanations based on transport costs, imperfect spatial competition etc,
we suggest that land use may be driven by preference heterogeneity of different sectors
for the contiguous land use (CLU) characteristics of available plots.  We now go on to
outline the basic structure of the model, followed by a detailed worked example.6
4 CLU Model
Assume there are three types of utility maximising land users: H, C, I ˛ U
suppliers of housing services:  H
suppliers of office/retail based services:  C
suppliers of industrial goods:  I
Each land unit l has 2 contiguous regions and so is indexed lij where i is the upper
boundary and j is the lower boundary.  Thus, lHC can be thought of as a sequence of plots






The total land space can thus be conceived of as a single linear strip of land partitioned
into segments and joining end to end rather like a cylinder, torus, or sphere (see Figure 1,
Figure 2 and Figure 3).  If the total land space is a cylinder, then each land plot is a7
rectangular surface (this has the disadvantage of having two surplus ‘neutral’ sides); if
the total land space is a torus, then each land plot is a cylinder; and if the total land space
is a sphere, then each land plot is an eye shaped segment.  Of the three, the cylinder is
probably the least favourable as a conceptualisation because it still leaves two sides
which are not adjacent to any other plot, whereas in the torus and the sphere, all sides
are contiguous with one other plot.
Figure 1  Total Land Space Conceived as a Cylinder
Figure 2  Total Land Space Conceived as a Torus
Figure 3 Total Land Space Conceived as a Sphere
Because each of these configurations of land space can be represented as a one
dimensional sequence, it can be fully indexed with just one co-ordinate, written as an




4.1 Fundamental Transition Rules
Under free trade and well established property rights, any land owner can exchange plots
of land with other landowners, and so land plots can move between different uses.8
However, the transfer of use effects not only the characteristics of plot itself but also of
all adjacent plots.  The rules underlying these effects are as follows: for a given plot of
land under the ownership and use of landowner type M, l
M
ij, transfer of this plot to
another landowner type, denoted by N, the contiguous land use of adjacent plots will
change from iM to iN and Mj to Nj for plots to the north and to the south respectively.
Thus,
lij
M  ﬁ  lij
N  ￿  l-1iM  ﬁ  l-1iN
￿ l+1Mj ﬁ l+1Nj
4.2 Preferences and Endowments
4.2.1
4.2.2 Housing Land Users
The initial endowment of H is given by,
e
H = S l
H
ij where i,j ˛ K
So, for example, if H initially has five plots, then 5l
H = e











The total utility of this endowment is given by:
U
H(e



















It is assumed that housing land-users have a joint utility function and strong preferences

















This can be written as,
l
H














































4.3.1 Commercial Land Users
Commercial land users, C, have initial endowment e
C = S l
C






ij).  They also wish to maximise utility, and have preferences described as follows,
4.3.2l
C











4.3.3 Industrial Land Users
Industrial land users, I, have initial endowment e
I = S l
I






ij).  They aim to maximise utility, and have preferences described as follows,
l
I











They are thus indifferent between different CLUs.
4.4 The Basis of Trade
It is assumed that trade is carried out on the basis of 100% recyclability of all land. There
are no transport costs, and no money.  Trade is entirely on the basis of barter.
Indivisibility of land units will therefore preclude certain trade possibilities since
exchange rates have to be achievable through exchange of whole plots in order to be
feasible.
4.4.1 Minimum Exchange Rate Rule
If H owns plot(s) of land l
H
ij and is offered plot(s) lfg in exchange for l
H
ij, then the






If the exchange rate on offer is greater than or equal to this ratio of utilities, then the
owner will not trade.  Thus, H will only trade if,
x/y  <  u
H (lij)/ u
H(lfg)10
4.4.2 Exchange Rate Arbitration
Because each land user wants to maximise utility, each will also want to trade at the limit
of the others reservation rate.  For trade to take place, it is assumed that an independent
arbiter takes the list of possible exchange rates lying between the two trading partners
reservation exchange rates and selects the median as the basis for exchange.  If there are
an even number of possibilities, and a unique median cannot be identified, both central
rates are taken as possibilities.
4.4.3 Decision Rule for Exchange
It is assumed that in each round of trade, only one bilateral transaction can take place.
Thus, either H trades with I, or I with C, C with H.  Each player chooses to trade with
the land user offering the most favourable deal.  Thus it is possible that that no trade will
take place because, for example, H would rather trade with I, but I would rather trade
with C, and C would rather trade with H.  Similarly, trade will not trade place if more
than one player faces exchange rates lower than his reservation exchange rate.
Obviously, each player would choose to purchase the plot combination which offers him
the most substantial total utility.  However, this may not coincide with the trade
combination that is most favourable to his trading partner.  Because land users have an
incentive to inflate their true utilities ascribed to each exchange package on offer, the
dilemma cannot be solved on the basis of declared total utilities (i.e. cannot simply
choose the option which gives the highest total happiness to all).  Instead, it is done on
the basis of each player revealing his ordering of plot combinations.  By each player11
ascribing a rank to each package (1 for the highest, 2 for the second highest, and so on),
the sum of ranks is calculated.  The package with the smallest sum of ranks is chosen and
where a tie occurs between packages, a coin is tossed to finalise the deal (i.e. a choice is
made through random selection) unless there is a complete opposite ordering and the
median coincides for both players.
For example, trade negotiations between H and I reveal the following ordering of
preferences for plot combinations pz = p1, p2, p3, … ,pZ (where pZ+1 = p1 and p1-1 = pZ):
Plot Combinations: p1 p2 p3 p4
I’s Ranking of combinations: 1 2 3 3
H’s Ranking of combinations: 4 1 2 3
Sum of ranks: 5 3 5 6
Chosen Package: X
Similar negotiations between H and C reveal another set of ranks:
Plot Combinations: p5 p6 p7 p8
C’s Ranking of combinations: 2 2 1 3
H’s Ranking of combinations: 1 3 2 3
Sum of ranks: 3 5 3 6
Chosen Package (random
selection between p5 and p7):
X12
Thus, H will trade with C if uH(p7) > uH(p2), and trade with I if uH(p7) < uH(p2).  If
utilities are equal, H will again toss a coin to choose.
5 Worked Example
To summarise what has been said so far, the preferences of H, C and I are such that
industry is happy to locate anywhere, commercial suppliers prefer to locate near other
offices or near housing, and housing suppliers prefer to locate near other housing, and
definitely avoid industry.  Whole plots can be traded on the basis of mutual gains.
Assuming constant marginal utility of consumption, a sequence of trading rounds can be
simulated based on an initial set of utilities and endowments.  Let, the utility vectors for
each land user be,
HH HC CC CI II HI
u
H (16 8 4 2 1 3)
u
C (6 6 6 2 1 2)
u
I (5 5 5 5 5 5)
and let the endowment vectors in round 1 of trade be,
HH HC CC CI II HI
e
H
t1 (0 0 0 5 0 0)
e
C
t1 (0 0 0 0 0 5)
e
I
t1 (0 5 0 0 0 0)13
























T    = 2514
Reservation exchange rate matrices are given by,
HH HC CC CI II IH
HH 1    1/2    1/4    1/8    1/16    3/16
HC 2 1    1/2    1/4    1/8    3/8
xmin
H  = CC 4 2 1    1/2    1/4    3/4
CI 8 4 2 1    1/2 1   1/2
II 16 8 4 2 1 3
HI 5   1/3 2   2/3 1   1/3    2/3    1/3 1
HH HC CC CI II IH
HH 1 1 1    1/3    1/6    1/3
HC 1 1 1    1/3    1/6    1/3
xmin
C  = CC 1 1 1    1/3    1/6    1/3
CI 3 3 3 1    1/2 1
II 6 6 6 2 1 2
HI 3 3 3 1    1/2 1
HH HC CC CI II IH
HH 1 1 1 1 1 1
HC 1 1 1 1 1 1
xmin
I  = CC 1 1 1 1 1 1
CI 1 1 1 1 1 1
II 1 1 1 1 1 1
HI 1 1 1 1 1 1
5.115
Round 1 of Trade




t1 = 5lCI e
C
t1 = 5lIH
(i)  CI  :  IH
 3 :   2 Reservation Rates
Median of Feasible Rates
= 4:3
(i)  CI  :  IH
 1 :   1
The median of 4:3 was calculated by ordering the all trade combinations, ordering them,
and then selecting the median of the feasible list as follows:









eh = 5CI ec = 5HI 1 1   1/2    1/5
1 1    1/2 1    1/4
2 2    1/3    1/2    1/3
3 3    1/4    1/3    2/5
4 4    1/5    1/4    1/2
5 5 2    1/5    1/2
   2/3 2    3/5
   1/2    2/3    2/3
   2/5    1/2    3/4
3    2/5    4/5
1   1/2 3 1
   3/4 1   1/2 1   1/4
   3/5    3/4 1   1/3
4    3/5 1   1/2
2 4 1   1/2
1   1/3 2 1   2/3
   4/5 1   1/3 2
5    4/5 2
2   1/2 5 2   1/2
1   2/3 2   1/2 3
1   1/4 1   2/3 4




Having agreed upon this exchange rate, both parties agree to offer all plots on this basis
because any trade will alter the CLUs of each plot anyway. The binomial distribution
formula states that for n possibilities and k selections there are n!/k!(n-k)! possible
combinations.  Since C and H have a total of 10 plots between them, and after trade, 4 of
these belong to H, this formula means that there are 210 possible combinations.
However, there are only a handful of equivalent types in terms of their utility values for
C and H, and an even smaller subset which H and C would consider given that most will
yield utility levels below their initial endowment and so be rejected.  The table below lists
the main combination-categories of trade if H was to trade 4 plots for 3 with C:
R1 p1 p2 p3
H H C H
I I I I
C C H H
H C H H
I I I I
C H H H
H C H C
I I I I
C H C H
H C C C
I I I I
C H C C
H C C H
I I I I
C C C C
p1 for example is will not be acceptable to H because it yields an overall utility of 8,
which is below that received from the initial endowment.  p3 yields a utility just equal to17
the initial endowment and so will be superseded by any offer that improves on the initial
endowment for H.
This leaves p2 as a feasible plot combination, yielding the following revised endowments
and utilities:
H:
HH HC CC CI II IH
u
H (16 8 4 2 1 3)
p1
H&C




t1) = 3(4) = 12
C:
HH HC CC CI II IH
u
C (6 6 6 2 1 2)
p1
H&C




t1) = 2(6) = 12
5.2 Round 1 of Trade between H and I




t1 = 5lCI e
I
t1 = 5lHC
(i)  CI  :  HC
 4 :   1 Reservation Rates
(i)  CI  :  HC
 1 :   118
Median of Feasible Rates
= 5:3
The median of 5:3 was calculated by ordering the all trade combinations, ordering them,
and then selecting the median of the feasible list as follows:
H and I:











eH = 5CI eI = 5HC 1 4    1/5
1 1    1/2 1    1/4
2 2    1/3    1/2    1/3
3 3    1/4    1/3    2/5
4 4    1/5    1/4    1/2
5 5 2    1/5    1/2
   2/3 2    3/5
   1/2    2/3    2/3
   2/5    1/2    3/4
3    2/5    4/5
1   1/2 3 1
   3/4 1   1/2 1   1/4
   3/5    3/4 1   1/3
4    3/5 1   1/2
2 4 1   2/3
1   1/3 2 2
   4/5 1   1/3 2
5    4/5 2   1/2
2   1/2 5 3
1   2/3 2   1/2 4
1   1/4 1   2/3 4
1   1/4 5
Having agreed upon the exchange rate of 5:3, both parties agree to offer all plots on this

















p1 will not be acceptable to H since it only yields an overall utility of 6.  p2 is feasible,
however, because it suggests utilities of 18 and 35 to H and I respectively:
H:
HH HC CC CI II IH
u
H (16 8 4 2 1 3)
p2
H&I




t1) = 8(2) + 2(1) = 18
I:
HH HC CC CI II IH
u
I (5 5 5 5 5 5)
p2
H&I




t1) = 5(7) = 3520
5.3 Round 1 of Trade between C and I




t1 = 5lHI e
I
t1 = 5lHC
(i)  HI  :  HC
 3 :   1 Reservation Rates
Median of Feasible Rates
= 5:3
(i)  HI  :  HC
 1 :   1
The median of 5:3 was calculated by ordering the all trade combinations, ordering them,
and then selecting the median of the feasible list as follows:21
C and I











eH = 5lCI ec =
5lHC
1 3    1/5
1 1    1/2 1    1/4
2 2    1/3    1/2    1/3
3 3    1/4    1/3    2/5
4 4    1/5    1/4    1/2
5 5 2    1/5    1/2
   2/3 2    3/5
   1/2    2/3    2/3
   2/5    1/2    3/4
3    2/5    4/5
1   1/2 3 1
   3/4 1   1/2 1   1/4
   3/5    3/4 1   1/3
4    3/5 1   1/2
2 4 1   2/3
1   1/3 2 2
   4/5 1   1/3 2
5    4/5 2   1/2
2   1/2 5 3
1   2/3 2   1/2 3
1   1/4 1   2/3 4
1   1/4 522

















p1 is not acceptable to C since it suggests an overall utility of 6 compared with the utility
of 10 associated with its initial endowment.  p2, however, is acceptable to both parties:
C:
HH HC CC CI II IH
u
C (6 6 6 2 1 2)
p2
C&I




t1) = 6(2) + 2(1) = 14
I:
HH HC CC CI II IH
u
I (5 5 5 5 5 5)
p2
C&I




t1) = 5(7) = 3523
5.4 Results of Round 1







 H&V), …, u
H(pz





 C&V), …, u
C(pz





 I&V), … , u
I(pz
 I&V) 35,35 35, 35 -
It can be seen from the following two tables that the ranking procedure is trivial for H
and for I:
H and C



























   ~ p2
C&I
Thus, H would prefer to trade with I and so would C.  I is indifferent between the
trading partners.24
5.5 Round 2
Assume I randomly selects H for trade, the plot combination actually traded is p2
C&H .
Endowments for round 2 become:
HH HC CC CI II IH
e
H











t2) = 6 + 3 + 2 = 11
e
I





Note that even though C did not trade, its endowment has been changed by the bilateral
trade between I and H, and as a result, C’s total utility has risen from 10 to 11.




t2 = 2lHC + 1lCI e
C
t2 = 1lHH + 3lII+ 1lIH
(i)  HC  :  HH
 2 :   1 Reservation Rates
Median of Feasible Rates
= 2:1 or 1:1
(i)  HC  :  HH
 1 :   125
(i) (a) 2lHC :1 lHH
The table below lists the main combinations of trade if H and C were to trade 2 plots for
1.
R1 R2 p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6
H I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I
C C C C C C H H
H I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I
C C C H C H C C
H H H C H H C H
I H H C C C C C
C C C C H C C C
H H C H C C C C
I I I I I I I I
C C C C C C H C
H I I I I I I I
I I I I I I I I
C C C C C C C C
HH HC CC CI II IH
u
H 16 8 4 2 1 3
p1
H&C





It can be seen that none of these combinations will allow trade, since the most favourable
for H would be p1 yielding a utility of 16, lower than its endowment at the start of round
two.26
(i) (b) 1lHC :1 lHH
The table below lists the main categories of combinations of C and H trading one for
one.
R1 R2 p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
H I I I I I I
I I I I I I I
C C C C C H H
H I I I I I I
I I I I I I I
C C C H C C C
H H H H H H H
I H H H C H C
C C H C H C H
H H C C H C C
I I I I I I I
C C C C C C C
H I I I I I I
I I I I I I I
C C C C C C C
It can be seen that H would only contemplate p1 or p2, so the other combinations can be
discarded.  But C would not contemplate p1 since it would effectively be trading one lHH
for one lHI which carries considerably lower utility.  Thus, p2 is the only feasible
combination:
H
HH HC CC CI II IH
u
H 16 8 4 2 1 3
p2
H&C




t2) = 16(1) + 8(1) + 3(1) = 27
C
HH HC CC CI II IH
u
H 6 6 6 2 1 2
p2
H&C




t2) = 6(1) + 2(3) + 1(2) = 13




t2 = 2lHC + 1lCI e
C
t2 = 1lHH + 3lII+ 1lIH
(ii)  HC  :  II
 1 :  8 Reservation Rates
Trade not possible
(C has insufficient II)
(ii)  HC  :  II
 1 :  6
(iii)  HC  :  IH
 3 :  8 Reservation Rates
Trade not possible
(C has insufficient IH)
(iii)  HC  :  IH
 1 :  3
(iv)  CI  :  HH
 8 :  1 Reservation Rates
Trade not possible
(H has insufficient CI)
(iv)  CI  :  HH
 3 :  1
(v)  CI  :  II
 1 :  2 Reservation Rates
possible
(v)  CI  :  II
 1 :  2
So, for (v), C effectively advertises 2lII for one lCI and subsequent trade is carried out on
this basis (i.e. all plots irrespective of CLU are offered at the exchange rate of 2:1
between H and C) even though as soon as trade begins, the CLUs of plots will change.28
(v) 1lCI :1 lII   ￿   2l
H for one l
C
The table below lists the main categories of combinations of C and H trading one for
two.
R1 R2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7
H I I I I I I
I I I I I I I
C C C C C H H
H I I I I I I
I I I I I I I
C C C H H C C
H H H C C C C
I H H H C C C
C C C C C C C
H H C C H C C
I I I I I I I
C C C C C H C
H I I I I I I
I I I I I I I
C C C C C C H
None of these combinations would be feasible since H would be made worse of than its
initial round 2 endowment.
(vi) CI : IH




(vi) CI : IH
 1 :  1
However, this yeilds the same results as (i)(b).  Thus the only feasible combination for
trade between H and C is p2 yielding respective utilities, 27 and 13.29




t2 = 2lHC + 1lCI e
I
t2 = 1lHC + 6lCI
(i)  CI  :  HC
 4 :   1 Reservation Rates
trade possible at 1:1
(i)  HC  :  HH
 1 :   1
(i) (b) 1lHC :1 lHH
The table below lists the main categories of combinations of C and I trading one for one.
R1 R2 p1 p2
H I I I
I I I I
C C C C
H I I I
I I I H
C C C C
H H H I
I H H H
C C C C
H H I I
I I H H
C C C C
H I I I
I I I I
C C C C
It can be seen that H would only contemplate p1, so the other combinations can be
discarded.  But p1 leaves both H and I with only the same endowment and utility as
before, so any other combination with proves to offer higher rates of utility than the
initial round 2 endowment, will also be preferable to p1.30




t2 = 1lHH + 3lII+ 1lHH e
I
t2 = 1lHC + 6lCI
(i)  HH  :  HC
 1 :   1 Reservation Rates
trade possible at 1:1
(i)  HH  :  HC




The table below lists the main categories of combinations for C and I trading one for
one.
R1 R2 p1 p2
H I I I
I I I I
C C C C
H I C I
I I C I
C C C C
H H H H
I H H H
C C C C
H H H H
I I I I
C C I C
H I I I
I I I I
C C I C
Given that I is indifferent between land combinations, it can be shown that p1 would be
C’s preferred choice, leaving C with only one plot adjacent to industrial sites, and
significantly improved utility:
C
HH HC CC CI II IH
u
C 6 6 6 2 1 2
p1
C&I




t2) = 6(1) + 6(1) + 6(2) + 2(1) = 26








t2 = 1lHH + 3lII+ 1lIH e
I
t2 = 1lHC + 6lCI
(ii)  HH  :  CI
 1 :   3 Reservation Rates
trade not possible
(ii)  HH  :  CI
 1 :   1
(iii)  II  :  HC




(iii)  II  :  HC




The table below lists the optimal categories of combinations for C and I trading two land
plots for one, and four for two:
R1 R2 p2 p3
H I I I
I I I I
C C I I
H I C I
I I C C
C C C C
H H H H
I H H H
C C C C
H H H H
I I I I
C C I I
H I I I
I I I I
C C I I32
Under p2, C’s utility increases to 20:
C
HH HC CC CI II IH
u
C 6 6 6 2 1 2
p2
C&I




t2) = 6(1) + 6(1) + 6(1) + 2(1) = 20





t2) = 5(8) = 40.
Under p3, C would still be better off than under the old regime:
C
HH HC CC CI II IH
u
C 6 6 6 2 1 2
p3
C&I




t2) = 6(1) + 6(1) + 2(1) = 14





t2) = 5(9) = 45.
5.6 Summary for Round 2
The feasible trading combinations are therefore as follows:
p3
C&I
t2 ;  u




t2  ;  u




t2  ; u




t2  ; u




t2 ;     u
H = 27; u
C = 13
H would order its options as follows:
p2
H&C




t2  ; u
H = 18
C would order its options as follows:
p1
C&I












t2 ;     u
C = 13
I would order its options as follows:
p3
C&I












t2  ; u
I = 35
It is clear, therefore, that C would prefer to trade with I,and I with C.  So this time it is H
that is left without a trading partner.  However, C and I have different ordering of plot
combinations:








C’s ranking 1 2 3
I’s ranking 3 2 134
X
Because the median package coincides for both players at p2
C&I
t2, this package is chosen,

















Already, after three rounds of trade, it can be seen that industry as gained land,
commerce has lost one plot, and housing has lost two plots.  It can also be seen that
housing and commerce have coagulated into homogenous groups of plots, effectively
sandwiched between blocks of industrial land use.
635
Implications
6.1 A Means of Connecting Commercial, Industrial and
Housing Sectors
A great gap in the existing real estate literature is the lack of work on the links between
commercial, industrial and residential sectors.  It is evident that they are connected in
two main ways.  First, through aggregate demand: the demand for commercial, industrial
and housing services are driven by fluctuations in general economic activity.  Second,
they connected via the supply of inputs, particularly labour and land.  This is particularly
so during boom periods where they may be competing for the same scarce supply of
construction workers or suitable development plots.  However, the demand for land
inputs of these three sectors is not only connected via the overall availability or scarcity
of land plots, but also by the effect on the qualitative aspect of land supply of each
sectors plot purchase decisions.  As the above model has demonstrated, if the demand
for land by H, C or I is influenced by the nature of the contiguous land use, then the
location decisions of each sector have a direct bearing on the location decisions of each
other sector.  It seems reasonable, then, to conclude that these contiguous land use
preferences and resultant allocations, will feed through to effect supply elasticities in
each sector and, thus, the price and quantity volatility of each sector.
Suppose, for example, that we were to introduce money into the above model, and that
the financial resources available to each of the three sectors fluctuates with the business
cycle, and that these fluctuations are not of equal amplitude.  The amplitude of the
commercial cycle may be larger than that of housing, for instance, because during booms,
the commercial sector is more prone to speculative bubbles (a large proportion of36
housing demand is for consumption), and during booms, housing is stabilised by the
welfare system. Because they are competing for the same limited land, the corollary
would be for the decline in the price elasticity of supply of housing during booms (see
Pryce, 1999) to be exaggerated because of the contemporaneous and more expansive
boom in the commercial sector.  In other words, at the time when new housing is most
needed, supply is constrained because of relatively greater increase in purchasing power
in the commercial sector.  Conversely, during a slump, the increase in the price elasticity
of supply of housing is exaggerated because of the contemporaneous slump in the
commercial sector and in its demand for land.  This means that during recessions, the
downward quantity adjustment to falling house prices is exacerbated.  The situation is
summarised in Figure 4 where the pivoting of the supply curve (exacerbated by
interaction with the commercial sector) results in an asymmetric housing quantity
adjustment between booms and slumps.
Figure 4   Asymmetric Housing Quantity Adjustment Between Booms and
Slumps Due to Interaction with the Commercial Sector
As we have already said, however, they are not strictly competing for the same land
because of their heterogeneous CLU preferences.  This heterogeneity profoundly affects
the substitutability of vacant plots in two senses.  First, it affects substitutability between
sectors: a vacant plot with a particular CLU will not be equally useful to each of the
three secots.  Second, it affects substitutability of different available plots within a sector:
two plots of vacant land with different CLUs will not be equally, and this acts as a barrier
to substitutability of land inputs, which in turn exacerbates the inelasticity of supply in
both commercial and housing sectors (we have assumed industry to be indifferent37
between plots with different CLUs and so all land is perfectly substitutable for the
industrial sector).  This asymmetry has the potential to produce a downward ratchet-
effect in housing services: only small increases in quantity during booms and large falls
during slumps.
6.2 Land Release Policy
This has implications for land release policy and urban planning.  The model has assumed
instance and total recyclability of all land, but even with this strong restriction, it is clear
that the demand for brownfield land may be weak depending on its location (i.e. its
CLU).  For example, consider the following clustered allocation of land, R1, arrived at
either by a central planning policy of zoning, or by the kind of free trade described in the
model.
R1 R2 R3
C 1 C C
C 2 C C
C 3 C C
H 4 H H
H 5
H 6 H H
H 7 H H
I 8 I I
I 9 I I
I 10 I I
I 11
I 12 I I
I 13 I
I 14 I I
I 15 I I
Now suppose that in the next period, two plots (plots 5 and 11) become vacant having
been reclaimed by/sold to the central planner by the previous occupier.  Maintaining the38
assumption of cost free recycleability, it is clear that given the choice of plot 5 or 11,
both commerce and housing would prefer plot 5.  In fact, assuming the same utility
vectors as in the model, even if two plots with industrial CLU were offered (plots 11 and
13 in R3), or even if 15 such sites were on offer, plot five would still be preferable to all
of them combined.  Of course, if land could not be instantly recycled at zero cost, these
preferences would be even stronger.
The irony is, that where land allocation is randomly distributed (even dispersion of land
use) rather than zoned (concentrated dispersion of land use), former industrial plots are
likely to be more attractive to housing and commercial developers since they are less
likely to be surrounded by other industrial sites.  The conclusion would appear to be,
therefore, that the more clustered the use of land, the more difficult it is to encourage
development on former industrial sites.
7 Summary
This paper has developed a model of land allocation based on heterogeneous contiguous
land use preferences and free trade of land (with the assumption that all plots were
instantly recycled upon use-transfer).  The result was that housing and commercial
sectors preferred to have fewer plots clustered together than more plots dispersed
amongst industrial sites.  The paper also discussed the implications of the model for the
price elasticity of supply of housing and also for land release policy.
8 Future Research Ideas
z Introduce plots with more sides (e.g. four sides ￿ squares; six sides ￿39
hexagons).
z Introduce transport preferences: H, for example, may prefer to travel to
work via H and avoid driving through I.  O may prefer to have access to
both I and H and other O plots.  I also may wish to have access to O and
other I plots:
8.1.1 H:  H  <------>  H  <------>  O
8.1.2 O: H  <------>  O  <------>  O <------>  I
8.1.3 I:  I  <------->  I  <------>  O40
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